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York County, initially noted "that claimant is neither assisted by any
presumption of noninsurance nor is he burdened by any contrary presumption of insurance." 17 The court further held that the claimant
must establish the noninsured status of the other vehicle by a fair preponderance of the evidence, and that, in the instant case, the claimant's
presentation was strengthened by the failure of MVAIC to in any way
controvert his evidence.
Aetna Insurance Co. v. Logue 7 1 is the most recent decision to at-

tempt to reconcile the need for an expeditious resolution of the issues
with the strict construction placed on the arbitration statute in Rosenbaum. The court proposed reasonable guidelines to determine when a
genuine factual issue calling for resolution under CPLR 7503(a) exists:
Arbitration should be stayed and at least an evidentiary hearing ordered where:
(a) claimant does not present some reasonably persuasive evidence of noninsurance (or other basis for invoking the arbitration
clause); or
(b) claimant has failed diligently to try to ascertain the facts,
within the practical limitations of the situation, or to follow up
some reasonable indication of insured status; or
(c) the insurance company presents some evidence that the offending vehicle is insured.
Arbitration should be directed, without ordering an evidentiary hearing, in the converse situation ....172
The Logue guidelines would end a confusing and inconsistent approach to an increasingly serious problem, reduce court congestion, and
encourage faster and fairer settlements.
CPLR 7503(a): Statute applied in conjunction with waiver doctrine
precludes all remedies in arbitrablecontroversy.
An agreement which calls for an exclusive remedy in arbitration
binds all parties to the extent that no judicial remedy may be sought
which would affect this contractual right. CPLR 7503(a) supplies a
means of enforcing such an agreement by providing for a stay of a
judicial action involving an issue arbitrable under its terms.
In Sowalskie v. Cohoes Housing Authority, Inc.,173 the defendant
sought a stay under CPLR 7503 on the basis of the parties' agreement
to settle all disputes by arbitration. Additionally, the defendant argued
that by commencing an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien, the plain170 Id. at 786, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 778.

17168 Misc. 2d 841, 328 N.Y.S.2d 569 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1972).
172 Id. at 846-47, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 575-76.
173 69 Misc. 2d 665, 30 N.Y.S.2d 481 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1968).
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tiff, as a matter of law, had waived his right to proceed in arbitration
under the agreement.17 4 The plaintiff opposed the motion on the
grounds that the relief requested by the defendant was inconsistent and
would deprive him of all remedies. 75 The Supreme Court, Albany
County, relying on case law and CPLR 2201 and 7503(a), held for the
76
defendant.
The Sowalskie case is apparently an anomaly. Subsequently, in A.
Burgart, Inc. v. Foster-Lipkins Corp.,177 it was held that commencing

an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien does not constitute a waiver of
the right of arbitration. Pointedly, the purpose of a stay of court action
is to force the parties to proceed to arbitration and thereby settle their
dispute.
CPLR 7503(c): Party estopped from objecting to time and method of
service of application to stay arbitration.
CPLR 7503(c) prescribes the procedure by which a party may move
to compel arbitration and the procedure that must be followed by the
opposing party if he wishes to stay arbitration. The latter requires a
party who has received a notice of intention to arbitrate which includes
a statement requiring any objection to be made within ten days to act
within ten days to stay arbitration or "be so precluded."
Prior to the Court of Appeals' interpretative ruling in Knicker78 there was much confusion regarding
bocker Insurance Co. v. Gilbert,1
the method of computing this ten-day period. In Knickerbocker, the
Court held that an application to stay arbitration posted on the tenth
day after receipt of a notice of intention to arbitrate was timely. 7 9 In
174 Id.

175 Id.

at 666, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 482.

176Id. at 666-67, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 488. CPLR 2201 merely provides: "Except where
othervise prescribed by law, the court in which an action is pending may grant a stay
of proceedings in a proper case, upon such terms as may be just." Moreover, the cases
cited by the court to support its denial of all relief to the plaintiff, River Brand Rice
Mills v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 805 N.Y. 36, 110 N.E.2d 545 (1953), and Application of Duke
Laboratories, 9 Misc. 2d 779, 168 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1957), involved stays
of judicial proceedings granted after the time to demand arbitration had expired. As
noted by the Court of Appeals, denial of all relief is preferable to permitting a party to
wait until the contractual time limit for arbitration has expired before commencing
an action at law on a claim which he agreed to arbitrate. See River Brand Rice Mills v.
Latrobe Brewing Co., 805 N.Y. 36, 41, 110 N.E.2d 545, 547 (1958).
177 63 Misc. 2d 930, 313 N.YS.2d 881 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1970) (mem.), aff'd
mem., 38 App. Div. 2d 779, 328 N.Y.S.2d 856 (4th Dep't 1972), aff'd mem., 80 N.Y.2d
901, 287 N.E.2d 269, 835 N.Y.S.2d 562 (1972). The Burgart court held that the plaintiff had
a right to continue the lien which he had a statutory right to file without waiving arbitration, under N.Y. LiEN LAw § 85 (McKinney 1966).
178 28 N.Y.2d 57, 268 N.E.2d 758, 820 N.YS.2d 12 (1971), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 45 ST. JoHN's L. Ra. 536, 550 (1971).
179 Id. at 64, 268 N.E.2d at 762, 820 N.Y.S.2d at 16.

